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Abstract
Large-scale foreign investments in African farmland are rising and may contribute
to agricultural productivity growth and economic development. However, host countries sometimes have to wait longer for the economic bene…ts to arrive than initially
expected. In this respect, the timing of project development is crucial and depends
on the economic incentives provided to the investors. We therefore present a dynamic
stochastic programming model that re‡ects the typical bargaining situation concerning
large land deals in Africa and allows the e¤ect of market- and country-speci…c risks and
taxation to be assessed. The model shows that commodity price volatility increases the
value of the land development option, but slows down the land development process.
Furthermore, it shows that host country attempts to negotiate …xed commitments to
the speed of project development may run counter to the structure of economic incentives at the project site. The applicability of the model is demonstrated for a recent
10,000-hectare cotton project in Ethiopia. Response surface estimations suggest that
Ethiopia has negotiated a contract under which it will receive about half the expected
total project value, as long as it levies the regular corporate tax rate.
keywords: foreign direct investment, land leasing, real options, nash
bargaining.
jel classification: C61, D81, F23, Q24.

We wish to thank the participants at the 2013 AAEA & CAES Joint Annual Meeting for useful comments
and suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies.
y
Corresponding address: Department of Economics, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, Box
7013, Johan Brauners vag 3, Uppsala, SE 75007, Sweden. Email: luca.di.corato@slu.se. Telephone:
+46(0)18671758.
z
Department of Economics, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, Uppsala, Sweden.

1

1

Introduction

Foreign direct investment (FDI) by multinational corporations or governments in the agricultural land of developing and least developed countries1 is an ongoing trend (e.g. Visser and
Spoor 2011; Cotula et al. 2009) which appears to be driven by the rising and increasingly
volatile prices of agricultural commodities (see e.g. von Braun and Meinzen-Dick 2009; Collier and Venables 2012; Deininger et al. 2011; Hall 2011a). These recent price trends re‡ect
a combination of a rising global demand for food, biofuels and agricultural raw materials
on the one hand (e.g. Chakravorty, Hubert, and Nøstbakken 2009) and many distorting
national farm policies still in place on the other (Franco et al. 2010).
Ideally, this type of FDI would bene…t not only investors but also the host countries,
since it may lead to infrastructure development, technology transfer and job opportunities
in rural areas (see e.g. von Braun and Meinzen-Dick 2009).
In Africa, such investment projects are typically established as long-term land leases and
the host countries usually aim to bene…t through negotiated investor commitments towards
certain infrastructure projects, through taxation of the project, or through a combination
of both (Hall 2011b). However, from the perspective of the African host countries, several
such projects have proved to be disappointing (see e.g. Collier and Venables 2012), since
investors either failed to take the acquired land under cultivation at all, or cultivation has
been developing slowly compared with the expectations that were raised when the contract
was signed. In addition, it is frequently observed that expected and contractually established
bene…ts from project-related investments in the development of infrastructure do not seem
to be delivered by the investors (Cotula et al. 2009).
From an economic perspective, there are several potential reasons why a large-scale FDI
project in African farmland may only sluggishly deliver the expected bene…ts to the host
country. While some authors blame exploitative or speculative intentions by investors (see
e.g. Borras and Franco 2010), o¢ cial reports of international organizations tend to attribute
such failures to the institutional di¢ culties and governance problems encountered by foreign
investors in the host countries (von Braun and Meinzen-Dick 2009; Cotula et al. 2009).
The objective of this article is to analyze whether, and under what policy settings, the
interest of both parties to maximize the project value may lead to an outcome that also
maximizes their respective payo¤ from the investment project.
The article aims to contribute to the discussion surrounding such large-scale land deals
by developing a dynamic stochastic programming model. This model includes many aspects
of the typical bargaining situation between host country and investor. In fact, as for many
large-scale land deals in Africa, the model involves a foreign investor willing to invest in
land development and corresponding agricultural activities, and a host country land owner
potentially willing to provide access to land on the basis of a long-term leasing contract. For
simplicity, we use the terms “host country” and “host country government” synonymously
with “host country land owner”, even though our model could also re‡ect empirical cases
in which land owner and government represent two distinct parties. In any case, we assume
that the ‘land owner’ is that agent who has e¤ective control over the land and therefore
1

Large acquisitions in sub-Saharan Africa concern projects with more than 1000 ha but include examples
of a 452,500 ha biofuel project in Madagascar, a 150,000 ha livestock project in Ethiopia, and a 100,000 ha
irrigation project in Mali.
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enters the negotiations with the investor.
Access to land is costly, however. The foreign investor must pay a …xed rent to the
host country which is negotiated by the parties. In addition, taxes may be levied on the
investor’s pro…ts. Once the lease contract is signed, the investor has full control of the
land development process. However, the investor must take land development decisions by
accounting for 1) uncertainty about global market conditions for agricultural products, 2)
the risk of adverse natural or political events in the host country, and 3) a …xed sunk capital
cost for the activation of land as input for the production of agricultural goods. We solve the
underlying land development problem by determining the optimal time trajectory for land
conversion to agriculture and the value of the land development project.
Once the value of a hypothetical land development project has been assessed, we proceed
by determining the optimal rental payment that the host country should require. This is
done by considering two possible settings for the actual investment contract negotiations,
namely a cooperative and a non-cooperative setting.
The article makes the following contributions: First, we analyze the typical situation of
many large-scale farmland investments in Africa through a theoretical model that re‡ects the
economic incentives for investor and host country government under risk and uncertainty.
Insights from this analysis can debunk some of the myths around large-scale land deals
by identifying the role that economic incentives play for land development under uncertain
conditions, and this may also inform and guide a concerned public in African countries when
critically assessing the negotiation strategies of their governments.
Second, it is possible to use the modeling framework presented for numerical assessments
of the actual value of a speci…c investment project. Empirical speci…cations in this context
necessarily involve a lot of incertitude and therefore we use stochastic Monte Carlo-type
simulations with plausible ranges of key parameters rather than purely deterministic simulations. We demonstrate this approach by calibrating our model to a large-scale land contract
signed between the government of Ethiopia and the Indian "White…eld Cotton" company
for an investment concerning 10,000 hectares of cotton in the Ethiopian district of Dasenech
Nebremus. We use response surface design to evaluate the sensitivity of the model with
respect to exogenous parameters that may vary in certain plausible ranges, and we infer the
degree of bargaining power the respective parties were able to exert during negotiation of
this contract. Any indication of very unequal bargaining power may provide a concerned
public with valuable information about the way its government trades away domestic land
resources.
Third, we contribute to the literature on FDI under uncertainty through introduction
of a novel way to model the pricing of the investment option, and we introduce econometric response surface estimation as a convenient way to assess the response behavior of the
dynamic stochastic programming model.
The next section reviews the related literature and introduces our model. We then explain
how the project value is determined and what role the timing of the land conversion process
plays in this respect. In Section 3 we derive implications for the optimal rental payment
and the optimal pro…t taxation under alternative bargaining situations. In the last two
section we introduce our empirical implementation, and discuss and draw conclusions on the
implications of our analysis.
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The Model

The model developed in this article should be viewed in the context of two speci…c strands
of literature. The …rst strand includes scholars investigating the inter-temporal allocation
of land under uncertainty (e.g. Capozza and Li 1994; Bulte et al. 2002; Schatzki 2003; Isik
and Yang 2004; Song, Zhao, and Swinton 2011), while the second refers to research focusing
on irreversible FDI under uncertainty (Pennings 2005; Yu, Chang, and Fan, 2007; Sarkar
2012; Di Corato 2013). A unifying aspect for these two lines of research is represented by the
use of the option theory as the approach for the economic analysis (see Dixit and Pindyck
1994 for a complete treatment of the theory of optimal investment under uncertainty and
irreversibility). This approach is based on the following considerations: Irreversible decisions
under uncertainty may be later regretted, and therefore postponing such decisions in order
to gather information about future net bene…ts may generate value, the so-called option
value. Hence, for instance, when considering investment decisions, the investment should be
undertaken as soon as future prospects are promising enough to cover the full cost of the
underlying decision, i.e., sunk investment costs plus option value.
In the …rst strand of the literature, Capozza and Li (1994) pioneer the application of
option theory to land development by studying the problem of land conversion in the presence
of an option to adjust the land-capital ratio. In Bulte et al. (2002), a social planner must
determine if and when forestland should be developed. The optimal conversion plan must
be set taking into account the trade-o¤ between potential pro…ts accruing from agriculture
and the uncertain bene…ts, in terms of environmental goods and services, provided by the
forest if conserved. Schatzki (2003) and Isik and Yang (2004) investigate the decision to set
aside land under the Conservation Reserve Program. Schatzki (2003) shows that hysteresis
may characterize the decision of switching to permanent land uses and concludes that not
accounting for it may in‡uence the outcome of conservation policies. Isik and Yang (2004)
study the decision to participate in the Conservation Reserve Program under uncertainty
about agricultural pro…ts and set-aside payments. They show that the probability of program
participation may be importantly a¤ected by option value considerations. Song, Zhao, and
Swinton (2011) adopt a standard entry-exit model à la Dixit (1989) in order to study how
land should be allocated when two mutually exclusive destinations are available, namely
cultivation of food crops and energy crops. By allowing for the option to switch back and
forth between food and energy crops, they show how regime reversibility impacts on land
allocation decisions.
In the second line of research, Pennings (2005) studies the decision of a foreign monopolist
who may either export or set up productive capacity in a host country in order to feed the
local market. The decision must be taken under uncertainty about future demand and
irreversible foreign investment. Domestic bene…ts are maximized by strongly subsidizing
the initial foreign investment and by absorbing, through taxation, the bene…ts exceeding
the gains from exporting. In addition, taking a global welfare perspective, in the absence
of subsidies domestic welfare maximization induces underinvestment. Yu, Chang, and Fan
(2007) consider the impact on the timing of FDI associated with an entry cost subsidy and
a tax rate reduction. The two instruments are considered separately and then compared.
Those authors conclude that in order to foster FDI, the host government should favor an
entry cost subsidy, since this tool is less costly and more e¤ective. In contrast, Sarkar (2012)
4

shows that it may be optimal for the government to combine both investment subsidy and
tax reductions. This result is obtained by letting the government discount future net bene…ts
at a rate di¤erent from that used by the foreign investor. In Di Corato (2013), a foreign
investor contemplates the opportunity of investing in a project for the extraction of a natural
resource in a developing country. FDI is compensated by a share of the pro…ts accruing from
the mining project. Residual pro…ts are used to reward the host country for providing access
to the resource.
The model presented in this article shares several features with this approach. In our
model, for instance, land development is incremental as in Bulte et al. (2002). In addition,
the conclusions regarding the role played by taxation on the investor initiative are in line with
the literature on FDI. Furthermore, as in Penning (2005) and Di Corato (2013), government
and foreign investor share the investment project’s value on the basis of an agreement reached
in a cooperative frame.
However, the model that we present departs from the previous literature by considering
the "entry fee" (or its reduction) di¤erently. In most previous studies, the entry fee is usually
represented by the initial investment cost and the analysis mainly focuses on the impact that
a subsidy lowering this cost has on the speed at which foreign …rms invest in the host country.
In contrast, our model assumes that 1) no subsidies are paid and 2) the entry fee is
represented by the rental payment due to the host country. The foreign investor, by signing
the lease contract, commits to this payment. The rental payment is not conditional on land
development and must be paid in any case. Hence, in technical parlance, the initial transfer
between the two parties does not a¤ect the strike price of the option to develop land. It
follows that, by setting the rental payment, the two parties are implicitly pricing the option
to invest in land development. It is worth highlighting how this option is priced. First, the
option is priced in a cooperative frame. This is important since it accounts for 1) the fact
that both parties have as their …nal goal the initiation of the development project and 2)
the di¤erence in the bargaining power of the two parties. Second, the option price takes into
account future tax revenue and the e¤ect that taxation has on the exercise of the option
to develop. Third, the option is priced using an interest rate, which is adjusted in order to
account for host-country speci…c risk.

2.1

Basic set-up

Consider a risk-neutral host country (hereafter, HC) where a certain surface, L; of land
still in pristine condition, e.g. savannah, forestland, wetland, etc., is available. Assume
that HC is …nancially constrained and cannot fund a project for the development of this
land for the purpose of agricultural production, say marketable crops for food or bioenergy
production. A risk-neutral foreign investor (hereafter, FI) is willing to invest in such a project
if conveniently rewarded. Suppose that at a generic time period t the two parties can reach
a bilateral agreement for the lease of L hectares of land. On the basis of this agreement, HC
leases land to FI for a …xed and certain total rental payment, R 0.2 FI then has the right
2

This amount may be thought of as the net present value (hereafter NPV) of a periodic rental payment,
r, per hectare paid over the entire contract duration. So, assuming that the contractual agreement has a
term su¢ ciently long that can be approximated by in…nity, we can set R = (r= )L where is the discount
rate. This can be done at no loss in terms of generality for our results given the generally long duration of
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to develop the land and devote it to agriculture. A corporate income tax, s 2 (0; 1), must
be paid on each unit of pro…t accruing from the land once developed.
Denoting the hectares of land developed and under agriculture by At and the extent of
land still in its pristine state by Lt , at each t 0 land is allocated as follows,
At + Lt = L; with A0 = 0

(1)

Assume that land under cultivation guarantees the following pro…t ‡ow:3
( t ; At ) =

1
t At

=(1

)

(2)

where 0 < < 1 is a constant term representing the degree of decreasing returns to scale
(DRTS) and t is a random variable shifting pro…ts, ( t ; At ); over time. For simplicity, we
assume that no bene…t accrues to the landholder when land is undeveloped. This assumption
comes at no cost in terms of the generality of our results. Note in fact that our model may
be easily adjusted in order to account for a potential source of income from undeveloped
land (e.g., carbon credits).
Let t evolve according to the following di¤usion:
d

t

=

t dt

+

t dZt ;

with

0

=

(3)

where and are drift and volatility parameters and dWt is the increment of a Wiener
process with E [dZt ] = 0 and E [dZt2 ] = dt.
Using (2) and (3), we can express pro…t dynamics as follows:
d ( t ; At ) = (@ ( t ; At )=@ t )d t + (@ ( t ; At )=@At )dAt
= [( dt + dZt ) + (1
)(dAt =At )] ( t ; At )

(3.1)

where the …rst term represents the marginal e¤ect of changes in t while the second captures
the marginal e¤ect due to additional land conversion.4
Finally, we complete our set-up by including the following assumptions:
1. Land development is costly and irreversible. In particular, we assume that land development requires a sunk investment in capital costing k per hectare.
2. Land development is undertaken in the presence of country-speci…c risk. In this respect, our de…nition of risk includes all socio-political factors (war, riots, crime, etc.)
and natural events (as drought, ‡oods, etc.) reducing the pro…tability of the land development project initiated by FI. We regulate the occurrence of such adverse events
such projects in Africa.
3
Our pro…t function is consistent with a standard setting such as a price-taking farm whose production
technologies show decreasing returns to scale (see Appendix). Note that it may also apply to the case of a
monopolist using a constant returns to scale technology and facing a demand curve with 1= as constant
elasticity and a multiplicative shocks t . In our model = 1=[c(
1) + 1] where c and 1 c are the cost
shares for each speci…c input factor of a Cobb-Douglas production function and > 1 indicates the degree
of decreasing returns to scale, see Appendix A.1.
4
Note in fact that @ ( t ; At )=@At = (1
) ( t ; At )=At = t At .
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by a Poisson process (see e.g., Clarke 1997) with intensity 2 (0; 1) and denote by
! 2 (0; 1] the percentage of project value lost due to the adverse event. This means
that at each generic t, for each $ of project’s value, a loss equal to ! may occur with
probability dt.

2.2

Project value and optimal land conversion policy

In this section, we view FI as holding the option to develop land. We study the optimal
land development policy to be followed once the contract is signed and determine the value
attached to the land development project. As one can easily see, the opportunity of developing land does not depend on the rental payment once the contract has been signed, since
R must be paid irrespective of the development state of the land. However, the opportunity
does depend on 1) the random ‡uctuating convenience of agriculture, and 2) the threat of
adverse events that may partially or totally destroy the value of the development project.
L is developed while the
Suppose that at the generic time period t a surface At
remaining area, i.e., Lt = L At , is still undeveloped. Hence, assuming that ( t ; At ) is
such that the optimal strategy is to maintain the current land allocation, the value of the
investment project for FI is given by the following Bellman equation:5
V F I ( t ; At ) = (1

s) ( t ; At )dt + (1

! dt)

E[V F I ( t + d ; At )]
1 + dt

(5)

where (> ) is the discount rate.6
Solving Eq. (5), we show in the appendix that:
Proposition 1 FI develops land (dAt > 0) every time the process f
barrier
k
(At ) =
(
)At
11 s

t

:t

0g reaches the
(6.1)

or, rearranged in terms of pro…t, whenever current pro…t, (At ), reaches the critical threshold
pro…t level
k
At
(
)
(6.2)
(At ) =
11 s
1
where

= + ! and (> 1) is the positive root of the equation
= 0.

( ) = ( 2 =2) (

1) +

5

Note that e dt is the probability that a drop in the project’s value, due to expropriation, does not occur
over the next dt whereas (1 e dt ) is the probability that a portion ! is seized. Hence, in expected terms,
for each $ of project’s value we have:
e
' (1

dt

1 + (1 e
dt) + dt(1

6

dt

)(1 !)
!) = 1 ! dt

Note that > is needed in order to guarantee that the discounted stream of pro…ts converges. In
addition, note also that, in order to account for risk aversion, one may use CAPM and calculate a riskadjusted discount rate.
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Proof. See Appendix.
The critical pro…t threshold, (At ), is linearly increasing in At . That is, the larger
the surface under agriculture, the higher the agricultural pro…t inducing additional land
conversion should be. This implies that the expected timing for the development of the next
marginal unit of land increases as land is developed. This makes intuitive sense considering
that agricultural pro…ts are concave in the degree of (decreasing) returns to scale. Note also
that @ (At )=@ > 0: That is, the lower the degree of (decreasing) returns to scale ( ! 0),
, the earlier land development occurs in expected terms. As can be expected, the critical
threshold in (6.2) is also increasing in s, which means that the higher the corporate tax rate,
s, the slower the land development. A further element deterring conversion is represented by
higher capital investment costs k; since the critical pro…t threshold is rising in higher …xed
costs that are associated with the investment, i.e., @ (At )=@k > 0.
Let us now discuss the corresponding e¤ect of a change in the remaining parameters ;
; and .7 In order to do so, we rearrange (6.2) as follows:
(1

= [( 2 =2) + ]k

s) (At )At

(6.3)

The LHS of (6.3) shows the marginal net bene…t from developing a hectare of land, while
the RHS shows the corresponding marginal cost. Note that the marginal cost is represented
by the rental cost of a unit of capital, , adjusted by adding the term, ( 2 =2) , to account
for market uncertainty. The impact of expected pro…t growth, , and pro…t volatility, ,
on the critical conversion threshold is in line with …ndings in the real options literature. In
particular, we note that as future agricultural net returns become more volatile, the critical
conversion threshold rises and land development is postponed, i.e., @ (At )=@ 2 > 0. In
contrast, the higher the expected pro…t growth rate, , the lower the critical threshold that
triggers additional land conversion, i.e., @ (At )=@ < 0. Note also that lim !0 [( 2 =2) +
] = , i.e., as market uncertainty vanishes, land conversion occurs whenever marginal pro…ts
cover the rental cost of capital, k: Finally, a higher discount induces delayed land conversion,
i.e., @ (At )=@ > 0. This result deserves further comment on each speci…c component of
the discount rate . A higher implies a higher rental cost for the capital, k, while a higher
and ! imply a more likely loss in the project value and a larger loss due to adverse events,
respectively. It is immediately apparent that all these considerations lead to a more prudent
land development strategy for FI.
Now, let us determine the values of the land development project for both parties. In
the Appendix we show that:
Proposition 2 For any land allocation A L, the value functions of FI and HC are given,
respectively, by:
Z L
k
( ; A)
FI
V ( ; A) =
(
) d + (1 s)
(7.1)
1 A
( )

and

V
7

HC

( ; A) =

s
11

Note that @ =@ > 0; @ =@ < 0 and @ =@

s
2

k

Z

L

A

(

( )

) d +s

( ; A)

< 0. See section A.3 in the appendix.
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(7.2)

where

( )=

k
11 s

(

) :

Proof. See Appendix.
In (7.1) the …rst term represents the value of the option to develop the surface L A 0
, while the second term represents the expected present value of the project if the current
land allocation A L is kept forever. A similar interpretation can be given to the terms in
(7.2). However, it is worth highlighting that the main di¤erence between the two parties is
that only FI has control over the development process. In fact, while FI, on the basis of the
contractual agreement, keeps under its own control the land development process, dA, HC
may attach to the surface potentially developable only the expected value of the potential
earnings which can be obtained through the taxation of the pro…ts. Note that the term
( = ( )) is a stochastic discount factor which discounts future potential earnings accruing
from the future development of the surface L A.
Finally, let us conclude this section by studying the factors determining the dynamics of
land development in the long run. Using (6.1) and denoting the long-run average growth
rate of land development by E [d ln A] =dt, we can prove that:
Proposition 3 For any land allocation A
development is given by:
1
E [d ln A] '
dt

(
0

L the expected long-run growth rate of land
2

=2)=

for
for

>

2
2

=2
=2

(8)

Proof. See Appendix.
It is worth highlighting here that expected pro…t growth must be strong enough to have
a positive long-run average development rate, i.e., > 2 =2. Otherwise, due to the deterring
e¤ect of pro…t volatility, the rate is null. In line with these considerations, note that the
long-run development rate is increasing in and decreasing 2 . Note also that, as one could
expect, land development speed is decreasing in the degree of (decreasing) returns to scale,
. Finally, from (15), an immediate consideration is that the expected land development rate
is independent of the rate of corporate taxes, s. Note in fact that the change in the optimal
developed land surface is random because evolves randomly. In contrast, the corporate tax
is constant over time and thus it does not a¤ect the long-run optimal development path.This
in turn implies that as concerns long-run dynamics, HC’s …scal policy has a neutral impact.

3

The optimal rental payment

The value of the project for both parties depends on the timing of land development. This
is in turn dictated by the optimal development trigger, (A); which, as highlighted above,
is set by the party having control over the development process, i.e., FI. However, it is
important to stress the role that other two crucial aspects have on the development process:
1) the rental payment, R, to be paid by FI in order to have access to the exploitation of land
surface L, and 2) the tax rate, s, set by HC on FI’s pro…ts.
First, concerning R; as one can immediately see, the start of the land development project
is conditional on the two parties reaching agreement on the terms of the contract. Once such
9

agreement is reached, the contract is signed and the project can start. In this respect,
setting R is crucial. The rental payment must in fact be set in order to satisfy a basic set
of participation constraints. That is, at t = e
t where e
t is the time at which the contract
agreement is reached, the following conditions must hold:
W F I (e; R) = V F I (e) R 0
W HC (e; R) = V HC (e) + R 0

(9.1-9.2)

where et = e:
Note that by [9.1-9.2] we are simply requiring that for both parties the expected value
attached to the project is non-negative.
Second, note that:
Proposition 4 At t = e
t, given a certain tax rate, s, an agreement between FI and HC over
R always entails the immediate development of the following land surface:
e=f
A

(1

[(

2 =2)

s)
eg1=
+ ]k

(9.3)

The interpretation of (9.3) is straightforward. By (6.1), the level of at t = e
t is high
e
enough to support some land development, A. Note in fact that for any > 0; land should be
developed up to the amount at which the control stops the conversion process, i.e., > :
The magnitude of this amount of land depends, via (6.1), on, among other parameters, As
e and s is negative, i.e., @ A=@s
e
shown by (9.3), the relationship between A
< 0. That is, the
higher the corporate tax rate, the lower the land area that FI …nds pro…table to develop in
the …rst place. Hence, in technical parlance, by viewing L as a set of options to develop, HC
e options "in-the-money" and a subset composed of
is splitting it into a subset composed of A
e
L A "out-of-the money". The …rst group of options must be exercised as soon as the contract
is signed, while the remainder may be exercised later using (6.1). Changing perspective, HC,
by …xing s, is implicitly 1) setting short-run goals concerning the development of the land
surface L; and 2) setting the amount of land over which FI would exercise control. These
considerations seem in line with what is observed in the reality, where HC are often willing
to concede tax holidays to foreign investors.8

3.1

Cooperative and non-cooperative solutions

Meeting the goal of fast and vast land development would, however, come at a cost in terms
of tax revenues. As pointed out, this would in fact require a lower tax rate on pro…ts accruing
to FI. This loss may be balanced (or reduced) by setting a proper rental payment, R: Clearly,
as stressed above, this is not a trivial issue, since R must be set such that FI’s initiative
is not deterred. This choice is the subject of this section, where, given a certain taxation
regime, we study the de…nition of an optimal rental payment in two possible settings, namely
a cooperative and non-cooperative setting.
8

e = L:
In this respect, note that, depending on e and L; it may be feasible to set s such that A

10

Cooperative solution - Assume that HC and FI are engaged in a cooperative cakesplitting game where 1) both parties are neutral to the risk of internal con‡icts and 2) have
bargaining power, and 1
with 2 (0; 1), to each of them, respectively.9 As is well
known, we can solve the underlying game by applying the Nash bargaining solution concept
(Nash 1950; Harsany 1977).
A feasible Nash bargaining solution, R1 0 solves the following maximization problem:10
max
R1 0

1

=

) ln[W HC (e; R1 )]

ln[W F I (e; R1 )] + (1

In the Appendix, we show that:

(10)

Proposition 5 At t = e
t, when FI and HC jointly decide upon the optimal rental payment,
R1 , in a Nash-bargaining frame, then the optimal payment is set as follows
R1 = (1

)V F I (e)

V HC (e)

(10.1)

The interpretation is straightforward. The optimal payment is set on the basis of the
relative strength of the two parties. Note in fact that, as expected, R1 is increasing in HC’s
bargaining power and decreasing in FI’s strength. Note also that given a certain power
allocation ( ; 1
), a lower R1 is paid as the expected value of tax revenues, V HC (e),
increases. Consistently, a higher payment is due when a higher expected value is attached
to FI’s net revenues, V F I (e): Substituting (10.1) into (9.1-9.2) yields:
W F I (e; R1 ) = V (e); W HC (e; R1 ) = (1

)V (e)

(10.2-10.3)

where V (e) = V F I (e) + V HC (e):
That is, the two parties share the total value at stake, V (e), in shares which are given
by their respective bargaining powers. It is worth highlighting that, by bargaining, the two
parties are basically setting an optimal risk-sharing contract. Note in fact that HC’s revenues
include a certain component represented by R1 and a volatile component represented by tax
revenues, V HC (e). In this respect, one may also view the tax rate s as HC’s share of FI’s
volatile pro…ts.
In addition, as can be easily shown, a su¢ cient condition for dR1 =ds < 0 is:11
s<

1
1+ (

1)

(10.4)

This means that within this speci…c range of values for s, a lower rental payment should be
paid if HC sets a higher tax rate. Note that, by lowering the rental payment, HC may be seen
9

Note that our frame may easily apply to the analysis of a Nash bargaining game where the two parties are characterized in terms of risk aversion. It would in fact su¢ ce to set the Nash product equal to
(W F I )p (W HC )q ; where 0 < p 1 and 0 < q 1; measure the level of risk aversion for each of the parties
involved.
10
The objective function (10) is de…ned on the net gains from bargaining. Disagreement pay-o¤s are null,
since without agreement the land development project is not activated.
11
In the interval s > 1+ (1 1) the sign of the derivative depends on the amount of land developed as soon
e
as the contract is signed, i.e., A:
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as implicitly subsidizing FI. This is done in order to provide better contractual conditions
and encourage the signing of the lease contract. In fact, without an agreement land would
not be developed. This initial transfer will be repaid later by higher taxes. It is important
to stress that by doing this, HC assumes a more risky position. In fact, he will share with
FI the uncertainty surrounding future pro…ts and consequently the tax revenue. From FI’s
perspective, sharing risks and paying a lower rental payment is bene…cial and covers the cost
of facing higher tax rates. In this respect, note in fact that as ! 1 ( ! 1) condition
(10.4) holds for any 0 s < 1: Basically, as uncertainty soars up, the advantage attached
to risk sharing increases. In contrast, the impact of higher taxes is lower due to 1) land
development occuring only when pro…ts are very high and 2) the e¤ect of discounting. In
fact, the higher the uncertainty, the slower the land development process.
Non-cooperative solution - Assume that HC and FI are engaged in a two-stage game.
In the …rst stage, HC sets the rental payment maximizing local bene…ts, i.e., W HC (e; R). If
pro…table, FI signs the leasing contract and contemplates land development in the second
stage.
A feasible solution, R2 0 solves the following maximization problem:
max
R2 0

It is easy to show that:12

2

= W HC (e; R2 ); s.t. W F I (e; R2 )

0

(11)

Proposition 6 At t = e
t, when HC decide upon the optimal rental payment, R2 , in a noncooperative setting, then the optimal payment is set as:
R2 = V F I (e)

(11.1)

Proof. Straightforward from Proposition 5.
The interpretation is as follows: The optimal payment to be set by HC is equal to the
expected value attached by FI to the development project. In other words, HC can implicitly
fully expropriate the bene…ts accruing from the initiative that FI may undertake. Note in
fact that:
W F I (e; R2 ) = 0; W HC (e; R2 ) = V (e)
(11.2-11.3)
However, it must be said that a non-cooperative outcome is extremely unlikely. In the real
world, HC must compete with other countries in order to attract FDI. Thus, competition
for capital leads, by increasing the bargaining power of foreign investors, to the development
of negotiations where the two parties must play cooperatively.

3.2

Corporate taxation of pro…ts

Let us conclude this section by checking the impact that corporate taxation has on the …nal
payo¤s.
12

Note that the problem in (11) corresponds to the problem in (10) for the case where FI has no bargaining
power, i.e., ! 0.
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Cooperative solution - By taking the derivative of V (e) with respect to s we obtain:
@V (e)
@V F I (e) @V HC (e)
=
+
@s
@s
@s
Z L
e
@A
s
)
dA
+
k<0
=
k
(
(1 s)2 Ae
(A)
@s

(12)

This in turn implies that
@W F I (e; R1 )
=
@s

@V (e)
@W HC (e; R1 )
< 0;
= (1
@s
@s

)

@V (e)
<0
@s

(12.1-12.2)

That is, a complete tax exemption would maximize both total value and each party’s payo¤.
The e¤ect of no taxation would be two-fold in that, …rstly, taxes would not distort the
de…nition of land development timing, and, secondly, the value of the land project would be
maximized.
By setting s = 0 we would have:
W HC (e; R1 ) = R1 = (1
)V (e) = (1
W F I (e; R1 ) =
V (e) = V F I (e)

)V F I (e)

(13.1)
(13.2)

That is, each party receives a portion of the value generated by the foreign initiative, V F I (e),
which is proportional to its own bargaining power. Note, however, that in this case the
agreement will not entail any risk-sharing between the two parties, since once HC has cashed
the payment R1 the whole uncertainty characterizing the project will only a¤ect FI’s net
bene…ts.
Non-cooperative solution - Since @V (e)=@s < 0, HC would be better o¤ setting a zero
tax rate. In fact, this would entail the opportunity of fully absorbing the value generated by
a more valuable project.
Comparison between cooperative and non-cooperative settings shows that the host country would always prefer to lead the game and impose its will on the foreign investor. However,
given that in reality host countries may compete with each other in order to attract FDI, the
bargaining power of the foreign investor increases and the two parties may reach agreement
only by negotiating in a cooperative framework.

4

Empirical implementation

Calibrating the modeling framework to an actual investment project is straightforward as
long as some core data about size, duration, location-speci…c variable costs of the planned
agricultural production and …xed costs of establishing the farm and development of the land
are known. For new projects, our framework can serve as a rule-of-thumb planning tool
that allows both investors and host country negotiators to compute the expected value of an
investment by explicitly taking market uncertainty and risk in the host country into account.
Furthermore, contracts that already exist can be assessed by our framework if negotiated
annual rental payments and pro…t tax rates are known. With this information, one can for
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instance assess the host country’s share of the expected total value of the investment, or
one can determine the distribution of bargaining power between host country and foreign
investor. Both can provide transparency and can support local interest groups and the
concerned public in the host country who may not be directly involved in the negotiations.
We therefore demonstrate the applicability of our model by analyzing an existing largescale investment project in Ethiopia:
As a visible outcome of growing critical public awareness about large-scale land deals,
individual governments have yielded to public pressure in a few instances and now publish
the contractual details of some recently signed large-scale land deals (Ethiopian Land Portal
2012). We demonstrate that our model closely re‡ects the conditions stated in some such
publicly available contracts. Speci…cally, we calibrate the model to a land lease contract that
has been signed between the Government of Ethiopia and the Indian company "White…eld
Cotton" (Ethiopian Land Portal 2012). The contract covers 10,000 hectares for cotton
production. The agreement between White…eld Cotton and the Ethiopian government was
signed on August 1, 2010 and the contract duration is 25 years. According to the contract,
the annual rent amounts to 158 Birr/ha. Furthermore, the contract requires 25% of the land
to be developed in year 1 and 100% by year 4. Both parties can terminate the contract
within 6 months unless grand majeure forces (e.g. draught, civil con‡ict, etc.) are the
reason. However, the contract does not contain any information on potential refunding of
the investor in the event of grand majeure forces. This most likely means that the investor
bears the full risk of such events.
The total net present value for Ethiopia, after taking the negotiated 3-year grace period into account, amounts to 15426.8 thousand Birr (TBirr) for the whole farm, which is
equivalent to 2.9 TBirr/ha (own computations based on Ethiopian Land Portal 2012).
With this information, we can calibrate the contractual part of the model. Furthermore,
in order to determine the pro…tability of the cotton production process, we use output and
input price data for cotton production around the time when the contract was signed. Table
1 presents all parameters that are exogenous to the model, some of which can only be
considered within plausible ranges due to incertitude or lack of precise information available.
Therefore, no attempt is made to present individual parameters at an overly ambitious level of
accuracy, and instead the incertitude attached to these parameters is explicitly incorporated
into the numerical implementation of the model by allowing them to vary stochastically
within the speci…ed ranges according to uniform distributions. Some of the speci…ed ranges
(e.g. corporate tax rate) are wider than the o¢ cial Ethiopian corporate tax rate of 35%
would require. This is in order to ensure that we assess the response behavior of the model
well around relevant values and within plausible parameter ranges, rather than too narrowly
for individual values that may need to be adjusted in reality. For instance, the investor may
perceive certain transaction costs (e.g. ine¢ cient bureaucracy, corruption) related to the
export of agricultural products and the import of production inputs as e¤ectively additional
taxation that would come on top of the corporate income taxes (Hall 2011b).
The cotton price in Table 1 is set according to the world market price (from www.cotlook.com)
around the time when the contract was negotiated (assumed 2010), re-expressed per hectare
under the assumption of the standard cotton yield of 3 metric tons/hectare that can be
expected for such a project in Ethiopia (Ethiopian Embassy 2013). The speci…c cotton price
for the starting period of a project simulation is drawn from a uniform distribution and
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then simulated to move according to a Geometric Brownian Motion with drift and volatility
parameters, as speci…ed in Table 1. The latter two parameters are also allowed to vary over
slightly wider ranges than can e.g. be observed for cotton over the past decade, but are
in line with observed volatility estimates for …nancial instruments based on agricultural raw
material indices since 2008 (OECD 2011). This decision about a rather wide parameter range
for drift and volatility is made in order to re‡ect the often cited claim that rising volatility
has triggered the recent interest in large-scale land acquisitions. In other words, we anticipate that investors may focus disproportionately on recent short-term time windows with
higher than long-term average price volatility, and that price volatility may be measured not
only according to real commodity prices, but also according to price movements for …nancial
derivatives that are based on agricultural raw materials (OECD 2011).
Table 1: Exogenous Parameters Used for Simulation of the White…eld Cotton Project
Variable
L
t
k
w

Description
Project size
Duration

from White…eld’s contract

25 years

from White…eld’s contract
plowing 2.1TBirr/ha and …xed cost to set up farm

Total Average Cost / ha

6.472 TBirr

for an assumed yield of 3000kg/ha

[0.05;0.5]

randomly drawn

[0.005;0.04]

randomly drawn

starting price cotton

[11,14]

Average world cotton price (2010 in TBirr/ha)

Degree of DRTS

[2;60]

higher

Cobb-Douglas

0.25

Factor elasticity for non-land inputs

risk-free interest rate

0.05

loss (probability)

!
s

10,000 ha

13.48 TBirr

cotton price drift

c

Assumptions

Cost of developing 1ha

cotton price volatility

pt

Value or Range

[0.04;0.08]

!

CRTS

Poisson process; lower bound: one event in 25 years

loss (share)

[0.5;1]

share of investment lost due to political event

Corporate income tax

[0;0.5]

Ethiopian tax o¢ ce

For potential agricultural investors, the Ethiopian government provides illustrative standard
gross margin calculations for the production of the most common cash crops. These standard
gross margins refer to typical large-scale investment projects and the data are distributed
through the diplomatic body of various foreign Ethiopian embassies (Ethiopian Embassy
2013). Even though these gross margin computations may in some instances appear simplistic, we assume that they provide a fundamentally realistic approximation of the ex ante
cost estimations that investors make about a prospective cotton project in reality.
For the purpose of calibration, these cost …gures are re-expressed in terms of per hectare
cost (Table 1). For instance, the cost of developing 1 ha is estimated as the cost of surveying,
clearing and leveling farm land and main canal drainage, plus building access through farm
roads including hydraulic structure constructions. This total cost is estimated to be about
Birr 4.2 million for a hypothetical 2000 ha farm, which is 2.1 Tbirr/ha (Ethiopian Embassy
2013).
The speci…cation of socio-political or natural risk of losses that may occur seldom, but
can nevertheless pose a major threat to the investment, is di¢ cult. One option would be to
consider one of the various country-speci…c risk indicators provided by the World Bank and
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other organizations. This information could be combined with location-speci…c data about
the past occurrence of extreme weather events such as droughts or ‡oods. However, the
sometimes dynamically changing socio-economic and political conditions in some African
countries suggest that historical data about these risks could be a poor predictor of the
future. Therefore, investors may just have to form an educated guess about the magnitude
of these risk sources.
As Table 1 shows, here we allow both the probability of a catastrophic event and the
share of the investment lost due to this event to vary over a relatively wide range in order
to assess the sensitivity of the model with respect to such shocks, and in order to re‡ect the
high degree of uncertainty that has to be attributed to these risk sources.
Furthermore, the model imposes for cotton production a Cobb-Douglas technology with
DRTS. Production inputs are land and all other inputs required to farm this land13 . The
approximate factor elasticities are obtained by computing the share of variable cost of farming
1 ha of cotton in total cost per hectare. The degree of DRTS is captured by a separate
parameter that needs to be speci…ed exogenously in order to allow the factor elasticity
on land to be derived as a composite to the factor elasticity for all other inputs. As the
DRTS parameter approaches in…nity, the production technology approaches the behavior of
constant returns to scale.

4.1

Simulation Experiment 1: Response Surface

Below we illustrate the e¤ect of each of the exogenously chosen parameters on the project
value to the foreign investor at the moment of signing the investment deal. For this purpose,
500 investment projects were generated under parameter settings that were simultaneously
and randomly chosen from the ranges speci…ed in Table 1 ("Monte Carlo simulations").
Based on these data, an econometric response surface is estimated. Speci…cally, the econometric response surface is an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression model that takes the
following form:
yi =

0

+

0

Xi +

i

(14)

where Xi is a vector containing the elements i ; i ; pti ; i , i ; ! i , si for every investment
project i = 1; :::; 500 and i is a term capturing random disturbances that are assumed to
follow a standard normal distribution. The coe¢ cients 0 and represent, respectively, a
constant term and a vector of regression coe¢ cients to be estimated on the elements of Xi .
The dependent variable in this regression model is expressed as the logarithm of the project
value to FI. Furthermore, we opted to approximate the nonlinear functional relationships
within the model by expressing the explanatory variables in Xi as their logarithmic values.
Additionally, we found that the number of hectares that the investor is willing to develop
e in equ. 9.3) is a very good predictor for the
immediately after signing the contract (A
dependent variable; however, including this predictor as a regressor in the response surface
is not possible because of its endogenous relationship with the dependent variable.
For the case of the White…eld Cotton contract, Figure 1 illustrates the occurrence of initial
13

We are aware of factor elasticity estimates for land in the literature. However, all such estimates that we
know of refer to conditions in developed countries and therefore we opted not to apply such estimates here.
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e for n=500 simulated projects, given the parameter settings speci…ed in
land development A
e covers between
Table 1: In more than 300 out of 500 cases, initial land development, A;
e falls into
9000 ha and the maximum of 10,000 ha. In about 150 out of the 500 cases, A
the category of up to 1000 ha. Interestingly, the results in Figure 1 also show that initial
activation of land takes in less than 10% of these 500 simulated project cases values between
1000 and 9000 ha.

e
Figure 1: Simulated values of the land immediately developed after signing the contract (A)
Figure 1 indicates that initial land development according to our model takes the overall
characteristic of an ’everything or nothing’strategy. The government of Ethiopia may therefore need to reconsider its current practice of contractually requiring initial land development
during the …rst four years (Ethiopian Land Portal 2012). Fixing the land development path
in this arti…cial way may address the Ethiopian desire to avoid projects under which foreign
investors acquire land without actually getting any development started. However, our model
suggests that the economic driving forces of land development on the side of the investor are
likely to be very strong, making land development either pro…table or not, and a contract
that tries to regulate this may interfere severely with the investor’s perceived risk situation.
In other words, if the investor …nds the project convenient overall, land development will in
most cases be conducted as soon as possible. However, there is also the possibility that the
investor initially does not …nd land development on a large scale pro…table. According to
the model, such a situation indicates that the combination of uncertainties at the time after
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signing suggests holding the option to develop the land later instead.
Table 2 shows econometric response surface estimates based on the Ordinary Least
Squares Estimator and the experimental set-up for the exogenous model parameters according to Table 1.
Table 2: Response Surface Based on Double-log OLS Regressions

(Intercept)
ln[ ]
ln[ ]
ln[pe]
ln[s]
ln[! ]
ln[ ]
ln[ ]
Adj.R2

Estimate
0.3228
0.3673
-0.0269
4.218
-1.4816
-0.6388
-0.5691
0.5039

ln[V F I (e)]

Std. Error
0.3008
0.0179
0.0082
0.1006
0.0489
0.0345
0.0116
0.0359
0.92

Pr(>jtj)
0.2838
<2e-16
0.0012
<2e-16
<2e-16
<2e-16
<2e-16
<2e-16

Estimate
-4.3111
0.3968
0.0846
2.5643
-0.5844
-0.4371
-0.4336
0.5588

e
ln[V F I (e)=A]
Std. Error
1.2064
0.0721
0.0331
0.4035
0.1924
0.1384
0.0464
0.1441
0.29

Pr(>jtj)
0.0004
5.89E-08
0.0108
4.74E-10
0.0025
0.0017
<2e-16
0.0001

Table 2 contains results from two di¤erent response surface estimations, both using the same
data and explanatory variables. The …rst set of columns in Table 2 refers, as described, to
the log of the project value to the foreign investor at the moment of signing. Almost all
regressors are signi…cant at the 5% level or better, and the coe¢ cient of determination
suggests a satisfactory …t to the data. One advantage of the log-log transformation is that
estimated regression coe¢ cients can be directly interpreted as the corresponding partial
elasticities, with a 1% change in the regressor inducing a corresponding percentage change
in the dependent variable. The estimated coe¢ cient of the intercept has to be interpreted
as the log of the mean model response when all other regressors take zero values. A closer
inspection of the estimated coe¢ cients in Table 2 reveals that the partial elasticities of the
market price of cotton, the drift of this market price and the DRTS technology parameter
each have a positive e¤ect on the project value from the viewpoint of the foreign investor.
In line with expectations from the theoretical properties of the model, the estimated project
value will ceteris paribus be higher if the natural conditions of the investment project allow
for milder rather than stronger degrees of DRTS. In other words, the closer the production
technology in reality to constant returns to scale, the higher the expected project value.
In contrast, the estimated elasticities con…rm that the share of the investment lost due
to a potential adverse event and due to the corresponding probability of this event occurring
decrease the project value. The same holds for the introduction of corporate pro…t taxes. It
is interesting to note that a 2.8% corporate tax can roughly o¤set the value gains from a 1%
increase in the market price of cotton at the time of signing the contract. The sign of the
estimated coe¢ cient on cotton price volatility (log of sigma) appears negative and signi…cant.
This contradicts reports in the literature (see introduction) that rising price volatility would,
among other factors, actually attract global land deals. Due to the interplay of various
factors in our model, however, the positive role of market price volatility on project value is
dominated by the negative role that price volatility has on land development and initial land
18

conversion (compare Figure 1). In the second set of regression results in Table 2 we therefore
present a response surface regression with the dependent variable given by the project value
to FI at the moment of signing (=dependent variable from …rst set of regression results) but
e This dependent variable can be interpreted as the per hectare project
now divided by A.
value to the foreign investor (White…eld Cotton) that it would immediately develop. In this
regression, the estimated coe¢ cient on cotton price volatility is positive and signi…cant, which
con…rms the conventional insight that volatility is driving the project value in a positive way
and initial land conversion in a negative way; apparently, the negative e¤ect dominates the
positive one for the case of the White…eld Cotton contract. All other estimated coe¢ cients
maintain their previously estimated sign. The substantially lower coe¢ cient of determination
e (Figure
in the second set of regressions is due to outliers generated by the distribution of A
1): Most observations are divided by the maximum land available for development (10,000
e varies widely below this value for only a small number of observations. However,
ha), while A
given the overall robustness of the estimated coe¢ cients when comparing the …rst against
the second set of regression results in Table 2, we conclude from this scenario that the
method of econometric response surface estimation with double-log speci…cation can be a
parsimonious way to assess the e¤ect of individual exogenous parameters on the aggregated
model response, both in absolute terms and relative to other exogenous parameters.

4.2

Simulation Experiment 2: Estimating Ethiopia’s Bargaining
Power

The aim of the second response surface simulation scenario is to assess if the Ethiopian
government may have exercised a bargaining power that can be considered in line with the
public interest of Ethiopia. Since bargaining power enters the model as a parameter in the
range [0,1], intuition may suggest that a bargaining share of 0.5 re‡ects a balanced negotiating
power under which both parties meet ’on eye level’. Major imbalances in this bargaining
share instead may re‡ect either that one party has signed the contract without insisting on
getting a near to fair share of the expected total project value, or that this party factors
in additional bene…ts from the contract that are not directly observable. Such additional
bene…ts may re‡ect the Ethiopian government’s hope that a project such as White…eld
Cotton will generate further bene…ts through forward and backward linkages within the
local economy, and that the investor will provide e.g. infrastructure available for public use.
However, such unobserved bene…ts could potentially also re‡ect the attempt by some host
country negotiators to acquire individual shares in this investment project (i.e., corruption)
without necessarily passing them on to the public.
In order to determine ex post Ethiopia’s bargaining power in the case of the White…eld
Cotton contract, it is therefore necessary to assess all bene…ts that the host country is
de…nitely going to receive. In this respect, the White…eld Cotton contract states only the
rental payment over the 25-year contract period, which amounts to a total net present value
of 15426.8 TBirr for Ethiopia after taking the negotiated 3-year grace period into account.
However, a second potential source of revenue, not further speci…ed in the contract, is the
taxation of pro…ts once the farm has been established. Since no income tax is mentioned in
the White…eld Cotton contract, we initially assume that no income taxes are levied. However,
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domestic businesses in Ethiopia certainly face corporate income taxes that progress according
to level of pro…t. Expected pro…ts from the White…eld Cotton project would usually fall
into the highest tax rate of 35%. However, the Ethiopian government frequently grants
tax holidays of up to seven years, e.g. for start-up …rms. We therefore compare three
di¤erent scenarios of 500 simulated projects each. All three scenarios use exactly the same
speci…cations for the exogenous parameters as in the previous response surface experiment
(Table 1). However, the …rst of the three bargaining share scenarios …xes the corporate
income tax at zero, the second at 24% (which is equivalent to 35% under a 7-year tax
holiday) and the third scenarios taxes at 35%. The last two scenarios represent the most
generous possible and the maximum possible taxation scenario, respectively, as long as the
o¢ cial taxation rules for domestic …rms are also applied to the White…eld Cotton project.
Table 3 shows the corresponding inferred median and mean bargaining share that Ethiopia
has exercised in the White…eld Cotton contract, given uncertainty in the parameters as in
Table 1.
Table 3: Inferred Mean Bargaining Share of Ethiopia under the White…eld Cotton Contract
Corporate Tax

n

Median

Mean

Comment

0%
24%
35%

500
500
500

0.027
0.270
0.383

0.033
0.257
0.430

White…eld contract does not mention taxes
35% adjusted for initial 7-year tax holiday
Relevant Ethiopian corporate income tax

On assuming zero corporate tax, Table 4 reveals that this would correspond to a rather low
bargaining share of Ethiopia, with a mean around 3%. However, based on kernel density
estimates Figure 2 illustrates that this …rst scenario, despite its rather low mean, can still
re‡ect bargaining shares of around 10-15% in few instances. For the second and third
scenarios, Figure 2 demonstrates that the distribution of simulated bargaining shares is
much wider than for the …rst scenario, making a ’fair’(0.5) or near to fair bargaining share
certainly realistic. However, Figure 2 also indicates that, in rare events of bargaining shares
exceeding 50%, Ethiopia may actually have negotiated with White…eld Cotton a deal that
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would be especially favorable for Ethiopia.

Figure 2: Kernel density estimates of Ethiopia’s inferred bargaining share
In summary, the results from the simulations indicate that for the case of the White…eld
Cotton contract: The Ethiopian public can be assured that Ethiopia may very well have
negotiated with the investor ‘on eye level’only under the assumption that Ethiopia applies a
35% corporate tax on the White…eld Cotton project. However, in order to attract the investor
initially, Ethiopia may have granted a tax holiday of up to seven years, despite the fact that
our simulation results suggest that under assumed price drift and volatility combinations
for cotton as in the year 2010, when the contract was signed, such a tax holiday may have
been unnecessary. Of course this does not automatically imply that the implementation of
this land lease project may not be unfair to other interest groups (although for the case
of White…eld Cotton we do not have such information); the model only states that the
bargaining power exercised can broadly be justi…ed as being in line with the interests of
Ethiopian society as a whole.
Furthermore, it should be stressed that none of the additional bene…ts in terms of infrastructure or job creation that the host country may hope to receive has been explicitly
stated in the White…eld Cotton contract as de…nite deliverables. Additional bene…ts that
may come in terms of infrastructure provision and job creation will be provided in the interests of the foreign investor anyway, if at all, as part of the pro…t-seeking operation of cotton
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production. Therefore, Ethiopia does not need to ’pay’for the provision of these additional
bene…ts from the investment.

5

Conclusions

The theoretical model developed in this article re‡ects the typical bargaining situation between a foreign investor and a host country for many currently ongoing or recently signed
large-scale land deals in Africa. The literature provides ample evidence that there is currently
a high degree of uncertainty about whether a certain project will prove to be bene…cial or
rather disappointing for the host country (e.g., Deininger et al. 2011). Such disappointment
is often linked to unful…lled expectations about the speed of development of the project and
related commitments to infrastructure for the host country.
Our model highlights that the speed at which land development under such an investment
project takes place is driven by the investor’s incentive to maximize pro…ts under uncertainty.
We solve the underlying cooperative game between host country and investor and determine
the optimal rental payment. It is shown that 1) the parties share the total value generated
by the land development project on the basis of their relative bargaining strength, 2) the
optimal rental payment should be such that, once added to tax revenues, the value accruing
to the host country is equal to its share of the total value, and 3) the land lease contract
is equivalent to a risk-sharing contract between the parties. In this respect, we show that
the host country’s payo¤ includes a riskless component represented by the rental payment
and a volatile component represented by taxes on the uncertain pro…ts earned by the foreign
investor. This implies that, for instance, by setting higher taxes and a lower rental payment,
the host country assumes a more risky position. In contrast, the foreign investor could reduce
the risk of the project by obtaining a reduction in the …xed rental payment; such a reduction
would function as an implicit subsidy.
Our results from Proposition 1 show that the larger the surface under agriculture, the
higher the agricultural pro…t required to induce additional land development. This implies
that the expected timing for the development of the next marginal unit of land increases as
more land is developed. This in turn means that even if global food prices remain at high
levels, the probability of further land conversion will decline.
However, the level of the rental payment has no impact on the land development policy.
In fact, by signing the contract, the foreign investor commits to this payment irrespective
of the destination given to leased land during the contract duration. In contrast, the level
of taxation levied by the host country on future corporate pro…ts may negatively a¤ect the
extent of land developed in the short-run. However, when studying the long-run dynamics,
we …nd that the long-run rate of land development is not a¤ected by tax considerations.
Proposition 2 presents a straightforward relationship between the expected long-run
growth rate of land development and price trend, price volatility and returns to scale. This
relationship can be empirically tested. Proposition 3 shows that as future agricultural pro…ts
become more volatile, the foreign investor postpones land conversion. In contrast, a higher
expected pro…t growth rate triggers faster land conversion. The model shows that commodity price volatility increases the value of the land development option, but slows down the
land development process. This result is in line with …ndings in the real options literature.
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As expected, socio-political and natural risk and associated losses slow down development.
A similar e¤ect is associated with pro…t taxation.
Hence, the sluggish land development sometimes observed in large-scale investment projects
in Africa may appear to the outsider to be speculative “land grabbing”, but according to our
model there are underlying economic reasons that can partly be in‡uenced by the government of the host country. Furthermore, the model shows that by keeping political risk and
transaction costs for investors low, for instance through good governance, host country governments can increase the total and thus their own payo¤ from an investment project. While
our model is unable to directly capture issues of bad governance surrounding such investment projects, it nevertheless highlights the pro…t-maximizing incentive of both negotiating
parties under uncertainty and country-speci…c risk. This risk may very well include riots
and unrest triggered by possible violations of human rights during project implementation.
In other words, if project development proceeds more sluggishly than expected by the
host country, this is an indication that market price conditions for agricultural outputs
and inputs, but also host country-speci…c risks, have proved to be more challenging for the
investor than assumed when the contract was signed.
Nevertheless, we do not deny that the occasionally reported cases (Hall 2011b) of violations of human rights in the host country can occur in relation to the introduction of
large-scale land deals, for instance if the host country is eager to o¤er land for investment
‘free from local people’. Under such conditions of unclear property rights, it is even more
important that a critical and concerned public requests transparency about the negotiations
and insists on an appropriate distribution of the total project value.
Our model cannot provide a solution to governance problems in the host country, but
contributes a robust and easily adaptable framework that all stakeholder groups involved
can use as a basis for discussion. We calibrated this model to one speci…c land contract
in Ethiopia for which we were able to determine plausible ranges within which important
exogenous model parameters are likely to occur. By using Monte Carlo simulations and
letting these parameters simultaneously vary from corresponding random distributions, we
were able to assess the model response surface econometrically and estimate the corresponding bargaining share that the Ethiopian government was likely able to raise in the case of
this speci…c contract. Such response surface estimates, once established for a speci…c contract, may enable host country administrators to conduct rule-of-thumb predictions about
the change in the project value if e.g. negotiations over potential tax exemptions take place.
The …ndings from the simulations indicate that the foreign investor will most likely seek
to develop all land immediately, but in about one third of simulated cases it will instead
postpone almost the entire land development. Therefore attempts by the host country to …x
a speci…c land development path in the negotiated contract are unnecessary.
However, our simulations also con…rm that, as long as it taxes corporate pro…ts from
this investment project according to the rules that apply to domestic Ethiopian …rms, the
Ethiopian government has on average exercised a near to fair bargaining share. Otherwise,
our results can inform stakeholders who were not involved in the negotiations about the
approximate size of the share of the total project value.
However, the role of cotton price volatility is more ambiguous than often claimed in the
literature. Our model shows that the positive contribution to project value is outweighed by
other factors that rather slow down land development.
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This article by no means intends to play down the seriousness of the human rights infringements reported for some large-scale land deals. However, our analytical framework
seeks to deconstruct such deals in developing and less developed countries from the perspective of economic theory and fundamental economic incentives that are likely at play in
reality. In this context, we …nd little justi…cation to argue about ‘good’or ‘evil’investors, as
some authors distinguish them (e.g., Collier and Venables 2012). Furthermore, the malfunctioning of public institutions within weak states cannot be expected to improve very soon
and appeals for a ‘good investment code of conduct’alone will not have much power unless
they are supported by very strong economic incentives (see von Braun and Meinzen-Dick
2009).
In addition, despite attempts to empower local people during negotiations about largescale land deals, it is perhaps realistic to assume that people who could potentially be
adversely a¤ected by large-scale land deals initially have only very limited bargaining power
at the time when a contract is signed. For this reason, there is no third party directly
represented in our model.
With respect to future research, we suggest case studies to clarify the extent to which a
higher degree of land development also increases the forward and backward linkages with the
local economy for the practice of actually observed land deals. Furthermore, high global food
prices may also directly increase the likelihood of political unrest in low-income countries,
which suggests that high pro…tability of farmland investment projects might be causally
related to a high risk of expropriation. If such a relationship between pro…t and political
risk receives empirical support, the results could be used directly in the calibration of our
model. For now, the model suggests that, as long as a ruthless strategy against the local
society creates tensions that raise the level of policy risk, the expected net present value of
the land development project will decline. Thus, a core …nding of the model presented here
is that an economic rationale for long-term sustainable economic growth based on large-scale
foreign direct investment in African farmland may very well exist. In reality, however, this
rationale may need to be supported through planning tools such as that presented here.
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Appendix

A.1

Pro…t function: a price-taker farmer

Suppose the farmer produces a certain agricultural product combining land, At , with a
variable input factor (or several other input factors), Bt ; e.g. labor, according to the following
Cobb-Douglas production function:
Qt = (Act Bt1 c )1

(1= )

(A.1.1)

where c and 1 c are the cost shares for each speci…c input factor and > 1 indicates the
degree of decreasing returns to scale.
In the following, in order to simplify the notation we introduce a = c[1 (1= )] and
b = (1 c)[1 (1= )]. Let pt and w be the output price and the unit price for Bt , respectively.
The operating pro…t at each t is then given by (pt ; Bt ; At ) = pt Qt wBt : Since apart from
land other inputs can be costlessly and instantaneously adjusted to maximize (pt ; Bt ; At )
over time, then the instantaneous short-run pro…t is given by:
1
t At

( t ; At ) =
1=(1

=(1

)

)

b
where = 1
with G = a ( b =w) b =(1 b ) :
a =(1
b ) and t = G pt
Now, assume that the price pt is stochastic and ‡uctuates according to the following
geometric Brownian motion:
dpt = p pt dt + p pt dZt

where p and p are expected growth rate and volatility of pt , and dWt is the increment of
a Wiener process with E [dZt ] = 0 and E [dZt2 ] = dt.
It can immediately be shown that t follows the geometric Brownian motion:
d

t

= [Gpt b

=(1

b)

=(1
[

+( 2p =2) b Gpt
= f p =(1

b)

+ p =(1

1=(1
b )Gpt
2
b )] =2

=

A.2

Proof of Proposition 1

b)

+

b [ p =(1

b =(1

b)

dWt =

and

+

p pt dWt )+

2
b )] dt
1=(1
2
b )] gGpt

+ ( b =2)[ p =(1

where

p =(1

b )]( p pt dt
b )] 1
[pt =(1

=

t dt
p =(1

+

b)

dt+

t dWt

(A.1.3)

b ).

Assume V F I ( ; A) to be twice continuously di¤erentiable. By using Ito’s lemma, the Bellman
equation in (5) can be rearranged as follows:14
(1=2)
14

2 2

V F I ( ; A) +

V F I ( ; A)

We drop the time index for notational convenience.
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V F I ( ; A) =
(1 s) ( ; A),
for 0
A L

(A.2.1)

where = + ! .
Di¤erentiating (A.2.1) with respect to A we obtain:
(1=2)

2 2 FI

v ( ; A) +

v F I ( ; A)

v F I ( ; A) =

(1

s) A

(A.2.2)

where v F I ( ; A) = VAF I ( ; A) is the expected marginal net bene…t from the conversion of a
marginal unit of land.
The closed form solution for the di¤erential equation in (A.2.2) is given by:
2
X

FI

v ( ; A) = f (A; ) +

hi (A)

i

(A.2.3)

i=1

where
1) +

1

> 1 and 2 < 0 are the roots of the characteristic equation ( ) = ( 2 =2) (
= 0, h1 (A) and h2 (A) are two constants to be determined and15
f (A; ) = (1

s)[ =(

)]A

The second term in (A.2.3) is the solution to the homogeneous part of (A.2.2) and represents
the value of the option to develop an additional unit of land. However, since the value of
such an option should vanish as tends to 0 then we must set h2 (A) = 0.16
The boundary conditions for (A.2.3) are:
v F I ( ; A) = k; v F I ( ; A) = 0; h1 (L) = 0

(A.2.4-A.2.6)

Conditions (A.2.4) and (A.2.5) are the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions for the
FI’s optimal development policy. Optimality requires that marginal bene…t and marginal
cost are tangent at the threshold
(see Dixit and Pindyck 1994, p. 364).
L: Substituting (A.2.3) into [A.2.4-A.2.5]
Condition (A.2.6) simply imposes that A
yields:
h1 (A) (A) + (1 s)[ (A)=(
)]A = k
h1 (A) (A) 1 + (1 s)[1=(
)]A = 0:
Solving the system for

(A) and h1 (A) we obtain:
(A) =
h1 (A) =

k
11 s
1 s A

(

)A ;
(A)1

Note that (A.2.7a) can be easily rearranged in terms of
(A) =

k
11

s

(

<0

(A.2.7a)
(A.2.7b)

(A). That is:
)

A
1

(A.2.8)

15
This is determined by using the method of undetermined coe¢ cients. Note that it corresponds to the
net discounted value attached to the conversion of a marginal unit of land.
16
Note that = 1 , hereafter.
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A.2.1

Comparative statics

In this section we analyze the impact of each parameter on the critical threshold for land
development. It can immediately be shown that @ (A)=@A = (A)=A > 0 , @ (A)=@s =
(A)=(1 s) > 0 and @ (A)=@k = (A)=k > 0. Rearranging (6.2) as follows
(A) = [( 2 =2) + ]kA=(1

(A.2.9)

);

it is easy to show that
(A)=@ = ( 2 =2)

@

@
A
k
@ 1
2

Taking the derivative with respect to
@

(A)
@

2

(A)
@

Note that since

A.3

=

( 2 =2) (
1)
A
g
2
2
[( =2)
] 1

k
A
k
@
( + 2 2)
= f
2
@
1
2
2
k ( 2 =2) +
A
=
>0
2
2 (
1=2) + 1

= [( 2 =2)

(A.2.11)

is
2

@
A
+ 1]k
@
1

+ ! then @

(A.2.10)

< 0:

we obtain:

=

Finally, the derivative with respect to
@

( 2 =2)
A
k
2(
1=2) +
1

=

=

2(

+
A
k
1=2) +
1

(A)=@! > 0 and @

(A)=@ > 0; @

(A.2.12)

>0

(A)=@ > 0:

Proof of Proposition 2

Inserting (A.2.7b) into (A.2.3), we obtain the expected marginal net value from the conversion of a marginal unit of land. That is:
v F I ( (A); A) = f (A;
By integrating it over 0
V

FI

A

( ; A) =

L we obtain the value function for FI:17
Z

L

v F I ( ( ); )d

A

= (1
=

(A.3.1)

(A)) + h1 (A)

1

( )

A

s)[
k

RL

Z

(

( )

) d

+

L

A

(

( )

) d + (1

s)

A1
1
A1
1

]
(A.3.2)

Let us now compute the value function for HC. Once the contract is signed, HC implicitly
transfers the option to develop the land surface L to the counterpart. This implies that the
17

Note that to guarantee the integral convergence we need to impose 1
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> 0:

strategy for the exercise of this option is …xed by FI and taken for granted by HC which
receives, as payment, a share of the pro…ts accruing as land is developed over time. Given a
certain land allocation A L, the value of the development project, V HC ( ; A), for HC is
given by the solution of the following di¤erential equation:
(1=2)

2 2

V HC ( ; A) +

V HC ( ; A)

V HC ( ; A) =

s A1

=(1

(A.3.3)

)

Di¤erentiating (A.3.3) with respect to A we obtain
(1=2)

2 2 HC

v

v HC ( ; A)

( ; A) +

v HC ( ; A) =

(A.3.4)

s A

where v HC ( ; A) = VAHC ( ; A) is the expected marginal net bene…t from the conversion of a
marginal unit of land.
The general solution to equation (A.3.4) is given by:
v HC ( ; A) = x(A)

+s

(A.3.4a)

A

where x(A) is a constant to be determined.
Since HC takes as given the land development strategy, we can determine v HC ( ; A) by
simply imposing the a value-matching condition v HC ( (A); A) = 0. This yields:
x(A) =

(A)1

s

(A.3.5)

A

Finally, substituting (A.3.5) into (A.3.4a) and integrating v HC ( ; A) over 0
have:
Z L
A1
( )
HC
(
) d +
]
V ( ; A) = s[
( )
1
A
Z L
s
A1
=
k
(
) d +s
11 s A
( )
1

A.4

A

L we

(A.3.6)

Proof of Proposition 4

Relation (6.1) can be equivalently rearranged as follows:
t

= (1

s) A

;

for

e = [( 2 =2) + ]k

(A.4.1)

where the process f t : t 0g and e represent the expected marginal pro…t and the marginal
cost attached to the conversion of an additional hectare of land, respectively. In technical
parlance f t : t 0g is a regulated process having e as upper re‡ecting barrier (see Harrison
1985, chp. 2). Note that 1), moves as ‡uctuates and 2) A will increase to prevent the
process from passing the barrier, e, whenever reaches the barrier e.
Taking the logarithm of (A.4.1) we get:
ln = ln(1

s) + ln
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ln A

(A.4.2)

which, on the basis of a straight-forward application of Ito’s lemma, follows the same Brownian motion that ln does. That is
2

d ln = (

=2)dt + dZ

Following Dixit (1993, pp. 58-68) the long-run density function for ln ‡uctuating between
a lower re‡ecting barrier, l ! 1, and an upper re‡ecting barrier, ln e, is given by the
following truncated exponential distribution:
f (ln ) =

2

(2 =
0

1)e

(2 =

2

1) ln(e= )

>

2

2

for 1 < ln < ln e.
It follows that the long-run average of ln is given by
Z ln e
ln f (ln ) d ln = ln e
E [ln ] =

2

=2;
=2:

(A.4.3)

2

=(2

)

(A.4.4)

1

Rearranging (A.4.2) and taking the expected value on both sides, we obtain:
E [ln A] ' [ln (1
= [ln (1

s) + E [ln ] E [ln ]]=
2
s) + ln 0 + (
=2)t

E [ln ]]=

(A.4.5)

Note that since E [ln ] is independent on t, di¤erentiating (A.4.5) with respect to t gives
the following expected long-run rate of land development:
2

E [d ln A] =dt = (

A.5

(A.4.6)

=2)=

Proof of Proposition 5

The …rst-order conditions for the maximization problem in (10) are18
@

1 =@RjR=R

1

=

From (A.5.1) we obtain
R1 = (1
or, di¤erently put,

W F I (e; R1 )

+

)V F I (e)

1
W HC (e; R1 )

V HC (e)

W HC (e; R1 ) = V HC (e) + R1 = (1

18

As one can easily check, the second-order condition holds.
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=0

)V (e) > 0

(A.5.1)

(A.5.2)

(A.5.3)
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